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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
POINT I 
PETITION FOR REHEARING IS PROPERLY BEFORE THE 
COURT UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
This Court has previously recognized that to make 
an application for a rehearing is a matter of right. Cum-
mings v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 P.619 (1913). Neverthe-
less, plaintiff-respondent recognizes that this right is 
not absolute and that a petition for rehearing should not 
be utilized to challenge areas of the Court's decision 
which respondent merely disagrees with or considers un-
satisfactory. Nor should the rehearing be used to reargue 
grounds originally presented. Cummings v. Nielson, supra; 
Beaver County v. Home Indemnity Co., 88 Utah 1, 52 P.2d 
435 (1935). The standard established by this Court in 
determining whether a petition for rehearing is proper v/as 
expressed long ago in Brown v. Pichard, 4 Utah 292, 11 
P. 512, reh. den., 4 Utah 292, 9 P. 573 (1886): 
"To justify a court in granting a 
rehearing it must be convinced that there 
has been a failure to consider some 
material point in the case; that there 
has been error in the conclusions here-
tofore arrived at; or that some matter 
has been discovered unknown at the time 
of the hearing." 
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^ fs v r>. "• See also Cummings v. Nielson, supra, • r~M 
Court stated the rc "i 1 TVV--T 
"Wlien this court. • . has con-
sidered and decided all of the 
material questions involved in a 
•• case, a rehearing should not be 
applied for, unless we have mis-
construed or overlooked some 
material fact or facts, or have 
overlooked some statute or decisi 01 i 
'which may affect the result, or 
that v/e have based the decision, on 
some wrong principle of law, or 
have either misapplied or over-
looked something which materially 
affects the result, . , If there 
are some reasons. . • such as we have 
indicated above, or other good 
reasons, a petition for a rehearing 
should be promptly filed, and, 
if it is meritorious, its form will 
in no case be scrutinized by this 
court." (Emphasis added). 
The remaining points of this brief wiVI adequately 
?.*~TA: t1 -'• ! i,-:.- peti 1 :i on for rehear: ng is prope-'l" v^ -*"~ve 
thir. c.^rt on tl le grounds that tl lis coin: t misc.i^Liv . ^ 
unapprehended certain material facts of this case in 
"*\ i i ts deci si on, ai id there are adequa te 
reasons' for rehearing tl le case - namely, the LO^IL*^ oi.:/ion 
has le^ miopr-f n i r- hho ^j ahi H t^  or t h^ ovi dence star'iar ] 
POINT ; 
TI„. OPT'TIO:? '•<' TIM COHI- • DID NOT ANSWER, CONSIDER, 
OR REFUTE 1 S ;> . . • • THE TRIAL COURT. 
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In its opinion in this case filed February 15, 
1977, this Court did not discuss or mention the specific 
findings of Judge Edward Sheya of the Carbon County 
District Court on the defendants request for an 
instruction on defense of habitation. According to the 
Supplemental Record, which the state did not have 
available for inclusion in its original Brief, but which was 
filed with the Court on January 5, 1977, and was alluded 
to during respondent's oral argument before this Court, 
Judge Sheya specifically found that there was not any 
evidence to support the requested instruction on defense 
of habitation, a defense provided in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-2-405 (Supp. 1975). The following excerpts from 
pages three and four of the Supplemental Record clearly 
reflect the trial court's position and its concern with 
avoiding error: 
11
 'A person is justified in using 
force against another when and to 
the extent that he reasonably believes 
that the force is necessary to pre-
vent or terminate the others unlawful 
entry into his habitation. However, 
he is justified in the use of force 
which is intended or likely to cause 
death or serious bodily injury only 
if, one, the entry is made or attempted 
in a violent and tumultous manner and 
he reasonably believes that the entry 
is attempted to be made for the purpose 
of assaulting or offering personal 
violence to any person dwelling or being 
therein and that the force is necessary to 
prevent the assault or offer of personal 
violence.' 
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The court, in the first place, 
was unable to find from the evidence 
that any force was necessary to 
prevent anyone's unlawful entry into 
the habitation. No one had advanced 
to the point where they became an 
immediate danger to the habitation. 
The evidence as I recall, was the people 
were standing, some were standing out 
by the truck. Some were standing out in 
the road. But I can't recall any evidence 
that anyone was advancing menacingly 
toward the door. Or was so near the 
door that something had to be done to 
stop the individual or individuals. 
Now on this matter of when you can use 
deadly force, the statute says, and the 
instruction, of course, quoted the language 
of the statute. That th^ entry has to 
be made or attempted in a violent and 
tumultous manner. Number 1. That is 
one element. I can't recall any evidence 
to the effect that these people who 
came in were engaging in violent or 
tumultous conduct. I think he said he 
looked out the window and saw these car 
lights, but I can't recall evidence which 
would support the theory that they entered 
in a violent and tumultous manner. So 
it seems to me that there is one element 
that is missing. And I can't find from 
the evidence that the Defendant reasonably 
believed that an entry was being attempted 
or made for the purpose of assaulting 
either himself for anybody in the 
dwelling. As has been mentioned, the 
argument between these individuals, 
the defendant and the deceased and a 
brother of the deceased was regarding 
tires. He had been forewarned that they 
were coming down to retrieve these tires 
that were claimed by them. Nothing 
was said to the effect we are going to 
come down and get you. We are coming down 
to do you great bodily injury. We are 
coming down to kill you. I can't recall 
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any evidence that they were going to 
do him any bodily harm or inflict 
personal violence upon his person. 
Or upon the person of his sister. 
I can't recall any evidence to support 
that. Or anyone else in the home, oF 
that the Defendant felt it was necessary 
that force was necessary, that is 
deadly force to prevent the assault or 
offer of personal violence. If it 
didn't exist, of course, he couldn't 
have intended to prevent it. So I 
am unable, aside from the fact that 
it is inconsistent with the accidental 
theory, that aside from that I cannot 
see where the evidence supports this 
instruction. In that there was no 
violent tumultous entry that he could 
not have reasonably believed that it 
was made, that the entry that was made 
was for the purpose of assaulting him-
self or his sister. Or that he had to 
use this force to prevent any such 
assault because it didnft exist. So 
because the court cou3d see no evidence 
to support this instr^^tion, I didn't 
want to commit error VJ support this 
instruction, I didn't want to commit error 
in giving it because our Supreme Court 
says it is error to give an instruction 
unless the evidence supports it," (Emphasis 
added) . 
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Although this Court held that it was 
reversible error for the trial court not to give 
the requested instruction on defense of habitation, 
it never refuted or specifically overruled the 
trial court's finding that no evidence was submitted 
to warrant the instruction. That leaves the paradoxical 
situation of having accepted the trial court's judgment 
that no supporting evidence was submitted, yet having 
decided that the instruction which therefore has no 
evidentiary basis must be given. 
Respondent submits that unless or until the 
trial court's findings are set aside for error or for 
abuse of discretion, the requested instruction was 
properly refused by the trial court, requiring this 
Court to affirm the conviction. In State v. Johnson, 
112 Utah 130, 185 P.2d 738 (1947), reaffirmed in State 
v. Castillo, 23 Utah 2d 70, 457 P.2d 618 (1969), this 
Court held that an appropriate instruction on a theory 
of the case is required if there is any substantial 
evidence to justify giving such an instruction. Under 
this standard, defendant in the instant case was not 
entitled to the requested instruction, based on the 
trial court's determination that there was not any 
supporting evidence. 
-7-
POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT ALLUDE TO OR DISCUSS 
RESPONDENT'S CHIEF CONTENTION ON THIS APPEAL; 
NAMELY, SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY 
AN INSTRUCTION ON DEFENSE OF HABITATION. 
On page two of the opinion, Justice 
Crockett, writing for the Court, said: 
"The argument that the 
defendant was not entitled to 
that instruction is: (1) that 
the sister's home was not his 
habitation; and (2) that it was 
inconsistent with his own 
testimony and theory of defense 
that the shooting was an accident." 
Respondent submits that neither of these theories 
articulate the State's argument to this Court 
requesting affirmation of the jury verdict. The 
only mention of (1) was at page seven of respondent's 
brief: 
"Even if, arguendo, this 
Court accepted that for purposes 
of this statute, appellant's 
habitation that evening was his 
sister's home, although he was 
merely staying the night, appellant 
could not surmount other obstacles 
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Clearly, respondent did no~b contend that 
even under appropriate circumstances, appellant 
could not use the defense of habitation defense in 
his sister's home; rather, respondent acquiesced to 
the theory that another's home could in some situa-
tions be appellant's habitation. 
The alleged theory (2) of respondent did 
not even appear in the State's brief. While this 
apparent inconsistency of defenses was noted by the 
trial court and perhaps mentioned before this Court 
on oral argument, it was in no sense relied upon 
by respondent in its request that Gaify Mitcheson's 
conviction for second degree murder be affirmed. 
Petitioner-respondent heavily relied upon 
and submitted to this Court the theory that defendant 
had failed to introduce sufficient competent evidence 
at trial to allow the defense of habitation instruction 
to be given. This Court did not meet this critical 
issue directly and therefore should grant a rehearing 
to consider its merits. 
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POINT IV 
THE COURT'S OPINION HAS CREATED CONFUSION 
ABOUT THE QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE NECESSARY TO WARRANT 
THE SUBMISSION OF A REQUESTED INSTRUCTION TO A JURY. 
State v. Castillo, supra, holds that each 
party is entitled to have his theory of the case 
which is supported by substantial evidence submitted 
to the jury. In the instant case, this Court, by 
not mentioning or referring to the trial court's 
specific findings on the evidence on this issue, has 
left the impression that no evidence or minimal evidence 
is all that is required to merit an instruction on a 
theory of the case. Until this Court resolves such 
confusion, trial court judges can no longer be sure of 
the proper evidentiary standard relating to jury 
instructions. Petitioner-respondent, at the very 
least, requests that this Court comment upon the 
viability of Castillo in light of the Mitcheson opinion. 
CONCLUSION 
Because this Court did not address the 
State's position and did not directly deal with the 
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trial court's findings, confusion over the evidentiary 
standard for requested jury instructions has arisen. 
Petitioner-respondent therefore requests that a rehearing 
be granted to resolve the issues outstanding. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
EARI, F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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